
# EXHIBIT 2



Research Report on Peak Fintech Group (Nasdaq: TNT, CSE: PKK)

## Peak Fintech Group Inc (NASDAQ: TNT; CSE: PKK): Strong Delisting Candidate on Millions Misappropriated

- Peak Fintech Group, Inc. (NASDAQ: TNT; CSE: PKK) is a Canadian parent to subsidiaries claiming to revolutionize China's ÿnancial system.
- Promotion-driven excitement for PKK's alleged rampant revenue growth has led a >1,000% rise in its stock during 2021 culminating with a NASDAQ uplisting in early September.
- The uplisting has been less than smooth sailing. It took just 11 days for the stock to be halted for ÿling deÿciencies and we believe it is destined for delisting.
- PKK's evolution is questionable at best. The company pivoted from failed, wannabe "Find My iPhone" software, to revenue-less IT services, to a fully impaired e-commerce platform before becoming a "hub" for commercial lending in China.
- While PKK touted its \$30m, September 2021 acquisition of "Heartbeat" (a China insurance company), we reveal the entity that received these funds is an unrelated company (that doesn't own the asset).
- PKK is not new to the "shell game". In December 2019, they claimed to direct \$1.4m towards a 70% stake in loan brokerage platform, Jinxiaoer, but ÿlings uncover PKK has never owned Jinxiaoer either.
- Even if PKK purchased these assets, they have nominal value and were grossly overpaid for. Both Heartbeat and Jinxiaoer generate almost zero revenue, low registered capital, and limited to no web trachiatory.
- PKK's scheme runs deeper than fake acquisitions. It reported vast revenue growth in its Fintech segment, but Chinese subsidiary ÿlings (from SAIC) expose that PKK has never owned Asia Synergy Financial Capital, the main operating subsidiary (despite claiming to own 51%).



PKK Trade Data (in CAD)	As of Oct 1st 2021
Share Price	\$9.58
52 Week Low	\$0.76
52 Week High	\$14.5
Market Cap	\$640M
Average Volume	548k
Shares Outstanding	66.81M

- PKK's CEO, Joseph Johnson is one of the most promotional ÿgures we've come across. Yet, he is just the face of a scheme to enrich Chinese insiders.
- We believe the real PKK mastermind is Liang ("Golden") Qiu, a Chinese conman whose prior company, LongKey, (former PKK client/related party), was blacklisted in China. Qiu remains a°lia ted with this criminal entity.
- We conclude, PKK is a quintessential "China Hustle" facing imminent NASDAQ delisting, potentially followed by identical CSE action. We have shared our ÿndings with both exchanges and PKK's auditor and consider the stock un-investable.

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Research Report on Peak Fintech Group (Nasdag: TNT, CSE: PKK)

## **Background: The Dubious Story of A Failed IT Company Turned Commercial Lending Hero**

Founded in 2004, Peak Fintech Group, Inc. (NASDAQ: TNT; CSE: PKK) is a holding company comprised of China-based ÿnancial technology ("Fintech") and ÿnancial services businesses. Through these subsidiaries, PKK says it is "changing the way Chinese Financial Institutions lend to SMEs (Small and Medium Size Enterprises)".

Promotion-driven excitement for PKK's "revolutionary" Fintech and rampant revenue growth has lifted the stock >1,000% since the start of 2021. This sensational run preceded the company's September 2021, NASDAQ uplisting under the symbol "TNT", an event that gave the stock another 100% boost.

The reality of what we found is that PKK is nothing like Square (NYSE: SQ), Upstart (NASDAQ: UPST), or any of the innovative Fintech companies it has been likened to. We are of strong opinion that PKK exists solely to enrich Chinese insiders through a series of sham transactions, all at the expense of North American Investors. We believe our ÿndings explain why the stock was halted just 11 days after it commenced trading on the NASDAQ.

PKK investors seem oblivious to several unsuccessful pivots which were led by its current management team before establishing its Fintech story. These endeavors included a 6-year attempt to commercialize software akin to "Find My iPhone" which shut down lost and stolen computers, near-zero-revenue-generating web development services, and an e-commerce marketplace which was fully impaired just two years after being acquired.

We urge investors to question how believable it really is that a company incapable of running dinky IT services businesses, has successfully assembled a portfolio of Chinese companies to make commercial lending safer and more e°cien t.

We expose PKK as another example of a US-listed, Chinese company whose North American ÿlings contain vast discrepancies to its Chinese reporting. Our research illustrates PKK investors have been lied to about how their capital is allocated, and that money is potentially being funneled to conmen controlling entities. Our conclusion is PKK is just another "China Hustle" destined for delisting. We have shared our yndings with the NASDAQ, the CSE, and PKK's auditor.

> PKK Rose From Being An Obscure Penny Stock To A Billion Dollar Company. PKK Was Awarded With A NASDAQ Uplisting, But Trading Was Halted Only 10 Days After Trading. PKK Temporarily Withdrew Their Form 40 - F On Sep 28th. We Believe We Have Uncovered The Facts That Might Have Led To The Suspension.

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Research Report on Peak Fintech Group (Nasdag: TNT, CSE: PKK)

## "Heartbeat" Acquisition: PKK Paid \$30M To A Seller For A **Company They Do Not Own**

Document 44-2

A few days after PKK's NASDAQ milestone, the company announced the acquisition of an insurance platform called "Heartbeat" from Huayan Kun Tai Technology Company Ltd. ("Huayan").

> "...it has acquired the assets of **Huayan Kun Tai Technology Company Ltd. ("Huayan")**, a private company that provides various SaaS (software as a service) solutions to insurers and insurance brokers in China

Huayan provides its solutions primarily through its proprietary "Heartbeat" (https://www.happysalers.com) insurance product management and brokerage platform, where users pay a subscription fee to access the services plus a commission-related service fee when applicable.

As compensation for the acquisition of Huayan's operations, Peak will pay Huayan and its shareholders a total of \$31.0M, of which \$11.0M will be payable in cash to be used by Huayan in various capacities to position Xinxiang for success as Huayan winds down its operations and transfers them to Xinxiang.

With a ~\$600m market cap at the time, \$31M seemed a signiÿcant investment from PKK. Investors and management were enthusiastic about the move. PKK's stock rose as much as 30% following the announcement and Huayan's CEO said it would "bring a whole new dimension to the Business Hub and increase its [PKK's] impact on B2B transactions in China." Unfortunately, the deal warrants the opposite sentiment as the \$31m was spent, but investors have received an unrelated entity instead of "Heartbeat".

PKK paid \$31m to Huayan, but Huyan does not own Heartbeat. The asset is registered under another company called Beijing Huike. We outline the process we went through to determine this striking reality.

In the Huayan/Heartbeat acquisition press release, PKK provides a link to https://www.happysalers.com. This link leads to a login page which leads to another link to the Chinese corporate registry.



source: https://www.happysalers.com

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Research Report on Peak Fintech Group (Nasdag: TNT, CSE: PKK)

## "Heartbeat" Acquisition: PKK Paid \$30M To A Seller For A **Company They Do Not Own**



Selecting "信息系统安全等级保护备案" (as shown above) directs us to a China Ministry of Public Security document. This is an o°cial ÿling of Beijing Huike Hulian Technology Ltd. ("Beijing Huike") which discloses Beijing Huike has registered Heartbeat (https://www.happysalers.com) on an "Information System Security Level Protection Registration" certiÿcate as pictured below.



We ran several checks to determine Heartbeat is truly registered under Beijing Huike and not Huayan.

First, we searched the registry of China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology ("MIIT"). When a company registers with MIIT, the information is retained and becomes publicly searchable on the organization's website.

Entering Beijing Huike's Chinese name 北京惠轲互联科技有限公司in MIIT's ICP Information Registration Management System yields the following results:



Website: www.happysalers.com

source: https://beian.miit.gov.cn

The Insurance Platform PKK Acquired Is Owned By A Completely Different Company Than The Seller Disclosed In The PR.

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Research Report on Peak Fintech Group (Nasdag: TNT, CSE: PKK)

## "Heartbeat" Acquisition: PKK Paid \$30M To A Seller For A **Company They Do Not Own**

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#: 1243

From this page, the "Details" section provides additional information which conÿrms that Beijing Huike is the registered owner of Heartbeat (www.happysalers.com), and that this registration was approved on March 22, 2021 (about half a year ago).



source: https://beian.miit.gov.cn



Additionally, it appears Heartbeat's trademark application has yet to be completed. According to this Chinese website, the trademark application was also submitted just months ago: Heartbeat's trademark application is still in the state of "Initial Review Notice", and the status of the application states "Trademark Application in Process".

Based on the status of the website registration and trademark application process, we believe the entity is still in the very early stages of development, which contrasts with the picture PKK painted for investors in its press release of the deal.

> It Appears That The Website Was Just Approved For ICP Safety In March 2021 And The Company Hasn't Even Received Approval On Their Trademark.

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Research Report on Peak Fintech Group (Nasdag: TNT, CSE: PKK)

## "Heartbeat" Acquisition: PKK Paid \$30M To A Seller For A **Company They Do Not Own**

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#: 1244

We made sure to verify whether Beijing Huike could be a subsidiary of Huayan and conÿrmed that this is not the case.



The above SAIC ÿling states Beijing Huike was established on March 13, 2019, and its registered capital at the time of its establishment was RMB 1M (~USD 156K). Its registered capital suspiciously increased to RMB 20M (~USD 3M) on March 25, 2021. On the same date, an individual named Kai Cui took 100% ownership of the company. Remarkably, according to this SAIC information, it is Kai Cui, not Huayan, who owns 100% of Heartbeat through Beijing Huike. Thus, we can conÿrm that the \$31m which was supposed to be directed to Huayan for Heartbeat should have been paid straight to Beijing Huike.

#### Why Would PKK Buy An Empty Entity (Huayan) That Does Not Own Heartbeat

After exploring what may have motivated the company to pay \$31m to an entity that does not own the asset PKK says it purchased, we determined this was likely to channel the funds to a group of insiders behind Huayan.

We have found a triangle of related parties behind Huayan whose Chinese name is 北京华焱坤泰科技有限公司, which directly translates to "Beijing Huayan Kuntai Technology Ltd." ("Beijing Huayan").



source: aichacha

According to Qichacha, Beijing Huayan was established in December 2014 with registered capital of RMB 10M (~USD 1.6M). One of the largest shareholder is Kai Cui who owns 10% of the company. Cui became a Legal Supervisor of the company on May 6, 2019 and has held this position since. As a 10% owner in Beijing Huayan, and a 100% owner in Beijing Huike, Cui forms the link between the two companies in question.



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
## "Heartbeat" Acquisition: PKK Paid \$30M To A Seller For A Company They Do Not Own

We noticed that Kai Cui became Beijing Huayan's supervisor on May 6, 2019 and has stayed in this position since. What we believe has happened is that Huayan is an entirely empty entity, that might have a collaboration agreement with Beijing Huike/Heartbeat. Therefore, we also believe the wording in the press release is terribly dishonest.

"Huayan provides its solutions primarily through its proprietary "Heartbeat" (https://www.happysalers.com) insurance product management and brokerage platform, where users pay a subscription fee to access the services plus a commission related service fee when applicable."

From Beijing Huayan there is another related party relationship with a company called, "Beijing Feiyang Tianxia Internet Technology Ltd." (北京飞扬天下网络科技股份有限公司). Kai Cui is the Legal Representative of this additional entity, while Beijing Huayan's 73% owner, Liang He is also an Executive O°c er of one of its subsidiaries, Beijing Feiyang Tianxia. We note that Beijing Huyu was a once-public company that operated and produced video games but was delisted for failure to timely follow annual reports and failure to meet debt obligations.

There is a slight possibility that one of these entities like Huayan has a collaboration agreement with Beijing Huike for Heartbeat, but whether such an arrangement is in place is unclear. Regardless, PKK's disclosure around heartbeat has been incredibly deceiving as we consider it to suggest Huayan is in sole control of the insurance platform.



source: qichacha

There is a slight possibility that one of these entities like Huayan has a collaboration agreement with Beijing Huike for Heartbeat, but whether such an arrangement is in place is unclear. Regardless, PKK's disclosure around heartbeat has been incredibly deceiving as we consider it to suggest Huayan is in sole control of the insurance platform.

The undisclosed ownership overlap solidiÿes our concerns about the transaction's true purpose. Our conclusion is that PKKs paid \$31m for Heartbeat, but is in the best-case scenario, a middleman with insigniÿcant ownership in the asset.

In case PKK does somehow receive any beneÿt Heartbeat, we assessed the economics of the asset to understand how it may impact PKK's ÿnancial performance. It turns out, even if PKK owned Heartbeat as reported, the sum paid for the acquisition is completely unjustiÿable.

PKK Paid CAD 30M For A Company That Is At Best A Middle-Man Without Ownership Of The Actual Assets. This Appears To Be A Strategy Of Extracting Money Out Of Public Co.

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Research Report on Peak Fintech Group (Nasdaq: TNT, CSE: PKK)

## Heartbeat – Vastly Overstated, Nonexistent Revenue and Suspicious Website Timeline

We obtained the SAIC ÿnancial data for Beijing Huike, which really owns the Heartbeat platform. We were shocked to ÿnd that Beijing Huike had generated **no revenues in both 2019 and 2020!** As of 2020, Beijing Huike's total assets were only \$296, with a negative \$59 shareholder equity!

Unit: US\$	2019	2020
Revenues	0	0
Net Income (Loss)	0	(\$60)
Total Assets	0	\$296
Total Liabilities	0	\$356
Shareholder Equity	0	(\$59)

source: SAIC financial data

Compare these ÿnancials to PKK's disclosure that the Heartbeat platform signiÿcantly increased the number of insurance brokerage companies on the platform within 2021, from 8 at the end of 2020 to 420 by the end of August 2021.

#### **Wayback Machine Indicates Website Very Recently Built**

Recall that the press release for the acquisition of Heartbeat was announced on <u>September 14th 2021</u>. We ÿnd it amazing how the <u>ÿrst available capture</u> from internet archive website, Wayback Machine, also occurred on September 14th, 2021. The archive shows nothing but a placeholder webpage.



It was not until <u>September 19th 2021</u>, that the second capture of the website was recorded. This archive displays Hearbeat's website they have today.



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Research Report on Peak Fintech Group (Nasdaq: TNT, CSE: PKK)

## Heartbeat – Vastly Overstated, Nonexistent Revenue and Suspicious Website Timeline


We believe this timeline casts substantial doubt over how real the supposedly growing insurance platform, Heartbeat, really is. It appears PKK created the website just to support the narrative the company acquired a budding platform "to bring Analytics and Al expertise to the platform."

To be sure PKK did not just pull it out of thin air and these web archives were not missing anything, we consulted web-tra°c da ta providers for Heartbeat stats. Of course, this exercise only conÿrmed our suspicion that this acquisition was completely misrepresented.

While one would expect web tra°c t o increase with the injection of so many new insurance brokerages, our research on Heartbeat's website tra°c indica tes otherwise. We consulted platforms including Alexa, Similar- web, and Baidu Index.


#### **Alexa**

Alexa has limited info on Heartbeat's tracc da ta and ranked the website behind almost 4 million similar sites.



#### Similarweb

SimilarWeb, another well-known web analytics outlet also lacks any information on Heartbeat's web tra°c .



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
Research Report on Peak Fintech Group (Nasdag: TNT, CSE: PKK)

## **Heartbeat – Vastly Overstated, Nonexistent Revenue and Suspicious Website Timeline**

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#### **Baidu Index**

As Heartbeat is a Chinese platform, one may argue slim results from Alexa and Similarweb are because they incorrectly track its tra°c . Yet, Baidu Index, a native internet keyword popularity tracker, yields the same results. Baidu Index has not even included the Heartbeat keyword on its search database.



Not only were we unable to ÿnd any meaningful web interested in Heartbeat or its website, but we also did not ÿnd any mention of the platform on China's largest search engine, Baidu.

We believe Heartbeat's nonexistent revenue, website history, website-tra°c, call the \$31m paid for the asset into question even ignoring our concerns expressed over the management and structure of the deal.

> All Evidence Indicate That Heartbeat's Business Performance Falls Way Short Of What **The Company Proposes.**

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Research Report on Peak Fintech Group (Nasdaq: TNT, CSE: PKK)

## Heartbeat Wasn't PKK's First "Fake" Acquisition; "Jinxiaoer" Still Owned By Individuals Rather Than PKK

Our research indicates that PKK has executed sham transactions before. We discovered PKK's acquisition of loan brokerage similarly has left investors with an empty entity.

On December 3, 2019, PKK <u>announced</u> it acquired 70% equity interest in a loan brokerage and commission paying platform, Jinxiaoer, from Jinxiaoer Technology Ltd. The total consideration paid for the asset was CAD\$1.4 million (CAD\$600,000 cash and CAD\$800,000 PKK common stock paid over 18 months).

PKK press released that Jinxiaoer generated total loan requests of 15Bn RMB from 40,000 registered sales reps in 31 Chinese cities and that it was "one of the most popular, and fastest-growing, lead-generating and loan-commission paying apps in all of China".

"In 2018, Jinxiaoer generated loan requests totaling 15B RMB (approximately \$CAD 3B) from over 40,000 registered sales reps affiliated with 2,700 loan brokerage companies located in 31 cities (see list below), making Jinxiaoer one of the most popular, and fastest-growing, lead-generating and loan-commission paying apps in all of China."

Despite this bold promotion, Jinxiaoer appears to simply be the predecessor to the Heartbeat heist, and yet another entity purchased by the company.

#### SAIC Financial Data Shows No Business in both 2018 and 2019, Contrary to PKK's Claims

The SAIC ÿnancial data show zero revenue for Jinxiaoer in both 2018 and 2019, respectively. Yet, PKK <u>stated</u> that Jinxiaoer generated loan requests totaling 15B RMB (~3B CAD) in 2018.

US\$	2018	2019	2020
Revenues	\$0	\$0	\$115,033
Net Income	\$0	\$0	\$94,894
<b>Total Assets</b>	\$49,569	\$0	\$111,964
Shareholder Equity	(\$131,600)	\$0	\$94,894

source: SAIC financial data

Jinxiaoer's low registered capital ÿgures also cast doubt over how the company could possibly generate 15B RMB loan requests. When the company was established in July 2016, its registered capital was RMB 100,000 (~US\$15,384), and its registered capital increased a whopping 21.62% to RMB 121,621 (~US\$18,700) in August 2018! It is extremely unlikely that a company with merely RMB 121 thousand registered capital can generate a total of RMB 15 billion in loan requests.



The Company Once Again Does Not Own The Company It Acquired. The Target Cos Financial Performance Once Again Falls Way Short Of PKK Disclosures.

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Research Report on Peak Fintech Group (Nasdag: TNT, CSE: PKK)

## Heartbeat Wasn't PKK's First "Fake" Acquisition; "Jinxiaoer" Still Owned By Individuals Rather Than PKK

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#### PKK Does Not Even Own Jinxiaoer to this Day

PKK acquired Jinixaoer in December 2019. Yet, almost 2 years later, PKK and its subsidiaries still do not own any equity in Jinxiaoer Technology Ltd. ("金小二科技(上海)有限公司"). We can see from the chart below that the company's largest shareholder is Jinxiaoer's founder, Tiegang Li (61.67%). He is listed as the CEO of the company on PKK's website.

We think Jinixaoer was just like the Heartbeat acquisition. It seems PKK shelled out the cash and diluted shareholders for nothing in return as it still owns no interest in an entity it ostensibly acquired almost two years ago. Even if we have missed something and PKK does own Jinxiaoer, the investment, like Heartbeat, would be a total waste of capital.



#### Jinxiaoer: An Inactive Platform and Inaccessible Website

Recall that PKK represented Jinxiaoer as "one of the most popular, and fastest-growing, lead-generating and loan-commission paying apps in all of China". We do not see where PKK could have honestly come to this characterization.

Jinxiaoer's website is inaccessible as of the date of this report. Furthermore, all its website archives are of broken pages, with the oldest archive dating back to August 2018, a year in which they claimed over 40,000 registered sales reps were on the platform.

We also attempted to download Jinxiaoer's mobile application and become a client. The app store on Xiaomi indicated that the application is in maintenance and is not available for download.

The app could not be downloaded on Apple or Android devices. Neither Google Play nor Apple's App Store host the application in any form. We question how popular the platform truly is if potential customers cannot even access it. Again, this acquisition is reminiscent of what we are seeing with Heartbeat today.



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
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Research Report on Peak Fintech Group (Nasdag: TNT, CSE: PKK)

## Not Just Fake Acquisitions, PKK Does Not Even Own Its **Key Subsidiary**

To our amazement, PKK's scheming extends beyond investments in hollow entities. Our research uncovers that PKK does not even own its subsidiaries. Consider PKK's corporate structure below, according to its Q2 2021 disclosure.



source: https://peakfintechgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/PKK-Q2-2021-MDA.pdf

We cross-checked the ownership data with SAIC ÿlings. We were shocked to ÿnd that Asia Synergy Financial Capital Ltd. ("ASFC") does not have any ownership relationship with PKK. In other words, according to SAIC information, PKK does not own any equity interest in ASFC. This is directly contradicting PKK's SEC disclosure where it claims to own 51% of ASFC for years!

According to an <u>investor presentation</u> in Spring 2020, ASFC's Chinese name is 宜兴市亚东科技小额贷款有限公 司.



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Research Report on Peak Fintech Group (Nasdag: TNT, CSE: PKK)

## Not Just Fake Acquisitions, PKK Does Not Even Own Its **Key Subsidiary**

Document 44-2

According to SAIC ÿlings, ASFC was established in May 2018, and its business includes lending to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The shareholder structure of ASFC is as follows:



source: aichacha

5 individuals own 100% of ASFC. We crossed checked for share pledges from these shareholders to other parties, but there are none. In other words, PKK does not own any equity interest in ASFC, despite claiming 51% ownership in the entity for years. Of the 5 shareholders listed as owners of the company, only Changsheng Zhuo appears connected to PKK. Since when does 15% equity ownership by a one specific management equate to a company owning a subsidiary?

PKK disclosed ASFC's ÿnancial information for both 2019 and 2020, and it appears ASFC is a signiÿcant subsidiary.

ASFC (CAD\$)	12/31/2019	12/31/2020
Total assets	22,254,512	23,131,786
Total liabilities	1,471,275	1,833,951
Equity attributable to owners of the parent	10,599,451	10,861,896
Non-controlling interests	10,183,786	10,435,939
Revenue from ASFC	3,408,251	2,446,058
Profit for the year attributable to owners of the parent	461,113	189,077
Profit for the year attributable to NCIs	443,032	181,662
Profit for the year	904,145	370,739
Total Revenues - Peak Fintech Group	11,708,653	42,698,047
Total Assets - Peak Fintech Group	29,445,032	61,307,542
Shareholders' equity attributable to owners of the parent - Peak Fintech	9,678,100	20,843,730
ASFC Revenues as of Peak's Total Revenue (%)	29.10%	5.70%
ASFC Assets as of Peak's Total Assets (%)	75.60%	37.70%
ASFC Equity as of Peak's Total Shareholder Equity Attributable to owners	109.50%	52.10%

source: Peak filings; Grizzly Analysis

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Research Report on Peak Fintech Group (Nasdag: TNT, CSE: PKK)

## Not Just Fake Acquisitions, PKK Does Not Even Own Its **Key Subsidiary**

In 2019, ASFC's revenues account for 29.1% of PKK's total. ASFC's total assets and equity account for the majority of Peak Group's total assets and equity, especially for 2019.

PKK claims to own ASFC through its wholly-owned subsidiary Wuxi Aorong Ltd. ("Wuxi Aorong"). We also checked the SAIC information of Wuxi Aorong Ltd. (无锡澳融实业有限公司).





source: qichacha

Last but not the least, according to PKK's 2018 annual report, it injected capital worth CAD\$10.4m to launch ASFC as a 51% shareholder, along with two other Chinese investors who invested CAD\$10 million for the remaining 49% equity interest in ASFC. Since PKK never owned any equity interest in ASFC, we are curious where the CAD\$10.4 million went.

> "ASFC was created during the second quarter of fiscal 2018 by a capital injection of \$20,340,000 of which \$10,373,400 was made by the company and \$9,966,600 was made by two Chinese investors. The investment made by each party represent 51% and 49% respectively. As a result of the investment by the Chinese investors, they now own an equivalent non-controlling interest in ASFC."

- Peak 201v8 Annual Report

Although it is unclear what exactly transpired in 2018, at this point, we cannot help but believe that this money might have gone into some insiders' or management's pocket. Because it's impossible to move this amount of money out of the company without insiders' approval and assistance, this could have been just an easy excuse to funnel real cash out of the company.

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Research Report on Peak Fintech Group (Nasdag: TNT, CSE: PKK)

### **PKK Financials Are Grossly Misrepresented**

PKK discloses revenues from its ÿntech segment, mainly through the supply chain services business, which grew from 76% of the total revenues in 2019 to 97% of total revenues as of the ÿrst half of 2021. With the company's total revenue increasing 265% in 2020, the main growth driver has therefore been PKK's ÿntech platforms. We are highly skeptical about the credibility of the reported ÿnancials, particularly this much-touted top line.

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	2019		2020		1H 2021	
<b>Total Revenues</b>	11,708,653	100.00%	42,698,047	100.00%	44,888,955	100.00%
Revenue - Fintech Platform	8,913,709	76.10%	39,836,785	93.30%	43,528,648	97.00%
Revenue - Financial Services	4,513,126	38.50%	3,384,417	7.90%	1,858,747	4.10%
Revenue - Other	227,482	1.90%	322,585	0.80%	296,734	0.70%
Inter-Segment Elimination	-1,945,664	-16.60%	-845,740	-2.00%	-795,174	-1.80%

source: Peak filings; Grizzly Analysis

On PKK's website, a research report issued by <u>eResearch</u> is cited which breaks down each subsidiary's revenue contribution. Three entities make up 94% of PKK's revenue. They are ASDS (上海尊方数据科技有限公司), ASSC ( 江苏金尊供应链管理科技有限公司), and Jinxiaoer (金小二科技(上海)有限公司).

	he past four years, <b>Peak</b> has created seven operating subsidiaries in China focusing on Fintec ons, primarily in the commercial credit industry.
1.	2016: Asia Synergy Information Technology (AST)
2.	2017: Asia Synergy Data Solutions (ASDS)
3.	2018: Asia Synergy Financial Capital (ASFC)
4.	2018: Asia Synergy Credit Solutions (ASCS)
5.	2019: Asia Synergy Supply Chain Technology (ASSC)
6.	2019: Jinxiaoer Technology Ltd. (Jinxiaoer)
7.	2020: Asia Synergy Supply Chain Technology (ASST)
Accord	ding to Peak's financial information, revenue from Q1/2021 was divided as such (Figure 3):
	ASDS, ASSC and Jinxiaoer: 94%;
	ASCS and ASFC: 6%;
	AST: negligible.

source: eResearch report

Considering there were no changes in the corporate structure since the report, it is reasonable to assume that these three companies were also the main revenue contributing entities for PKK in 2019 and 2020. We obtained the SAIC ÿles for these three companies for 2019 and 2020, and it turns out that PKK may have drastically overstated its topline in the past few years. For example, in 2019, PKK seems to have overstated revenue by 112%.

CAD\$	2019	2020
SAIC Filed Revenues - Consolidated Revenues from ASDS, ASSC, and Jinxiaoer	4,197,098	26,558,208
Peak Reported Fintech Platform Revenues	8,913,709	39,836,785
Overstatement (%)	112.40%	50.00%

source: Peak disclosure, SAIC filings, Grizzly Analysis

PKK Does Not Even Own One Of Its Own Subsidiaries. FinTech Platform Financials Are **Vastly Overstated.** 

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Research Report on Peak Fintech Group (Nasdaq: TNT, CSE: PKK)

### **PKK Financials Are Grossly Misrepresented**

Furthermore, the Fintech Platform label for this segment is highly misleading. According to PKK's own ÿnancials, they generated \$7,475,002 in revenue in 2017 from the business of buying and selling raw material products. In 2018 the company apparently rebranded that same business and called it the Fintech Platform. The name change may have appealed to investors, but the company's simple reclassiÿcation of the business segment without further details, suggests this core revenue generator for the company is still the old boring product resale business it operated in 2016.

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source: Peak filings; Grizzly Analysis

Largest Revenue Generator Fintech Platform Is Merely A Rebrand Of Buying And Selling Material Products Business From 2016.

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
Research Report on Peak Fintech Group (Nasdag: TNT, CSE: PKK)

### **PKK Management Can't Be Trusted**

Liang (Golden) Qiu is the CEO of Peak Group China who has been with the PKK since at least 2014. Prior to joining PKK, Golden was the co-founder and CTO of Longkey Software Technology, a cloud-based software provider for SMEs.

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#: 1256



According to his LinkedIn proÿle, he left the company in 2013.



However, our research indicates that Golden Qiu is still associated with LongKey. We believe LongKey Software Ltd is referring to the company Wuxi Lang Qi Software Technology Ltd. The company has been listed as "severely breaking laws", "abnormal operations" on several government black lists in China.



source: gichacha

In the key personnel section, Qiu Liang (No.5) is still listed as of today. This leads us to believe that Golden is deliberately trying to hide his connections to LongKey by falsely stating that he left the company in 2013. We assume he still chose to keep it on his resume since this is his only other professional experience outside of PKK.

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Research Report on Peak Fintech Group (Nasdag: TNT, CSE: PKK)

### **PKK Management Can't Be Trusted**

Furthermore, SAIC ÿlings also show that LongKey is majorityowned by LongKey HongKong Limited.

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source: aichacha

Coincidentally, LongKey appeared to be a signiÿcant related party to PKK between 2011 to 2016.

In 2011, PKK disclosed that all of the Company's revenues are derived from one customer, LongKey HongKong Limited (LongKey). LongKey was mentioned 19 times.

In 2012, LongKey was mentioned 16 times. The company also stated that all of the Company's revenues were derived from two customers, but failed to disclose who those were. We suspect LongKey being one of them.

In 2013, PKK even planned to acquire 51% of LongKey for CAD 2.5 Million, but ended up only acquiring 4% for CAD 350,000.

In 2016, PKK stopped mentioning LongKey altogether.

Golden Qiu, CEO Of Peak Group China Is Dishonest About His Involvement In LongKey, A Key Business Partner To PKK That Was Flagged As Severely Breaking The Law.

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Research Report on Peak Fintech Group (Nasdaq: TNT, CSE: PKK)

## A Look Into Strategy, Technology And Fintech Reviews History of Overpromises And Self Dealings

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CEO, Johnson Joseph has proudly <u>explained</u>, PKK "is very strategic." This is somewhat true—PKK is strategically noncommittal.

#### 2011 - 2012

Peak started o<sub>c</sub> being an IT secur ity solution provider in 2011. Currently, its sole commercial product is the HomeWave solution. There was a supposedly positive outlook for HomeWave at public listing. HomeWave was going to be adopted in China and the US and while CEO Joseph, only personally consulted companies about the e°cac y of the platform, the response was supposedly positive. Despite this guidance, PKK ceased patent application activities related to HomeWave in 2012. There are no Google results for HomeWave across various advanced searches from 2005 to 2011. Performance disclosure was limited for the product, but 2011 and 2012 clearly generated less than 200k on royalties for the platform.


	2011	2012
Revenue from royalties	2,500	275,020
Anortization of other assets	4,498	111,136
Total Revenue	(1,998)	163,884

#### 2014 - 2016

In 2014, as part of a shift to becoming an IT Portfolio Management Company, PKK acquired assets from Quickable.com. The forecast from management was for Quickable.com to generate significant revenue and "ÿt extremely well with our overall strategic vision and bring significant value to our various stakeholders."

PKK paid \$1.7m in total consideration, but immediately following the transaction the company "recorded an impairment of \$400,000. Based on the uncertainty surrounding the company's future growth prospects."

Considering the immediate impairment and Quickable's past, delivering "signiÿcant shareholder value" was likely always improbable. The archived images below show that at the time of the acquisition Quickable was an unsophisticated e-commerce platform with no di<sub>c</sub> erentiating characteristics and a limited selection of products. Today the website resembles a 90s website built by someone in their garage.a 90s website built by someone in their garage.





Today: www.quickable.com

Before; Captured by Wayback Machine

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Research Report on Peak Fintech Group (Nasdag: TNT, CSE: PKK)

## A Look Into Strategy, Technology And Fintech Reviews **History of Overpromises And Self Dealings**

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#### 2016 - 2020

In 2016, the company repositioned itself once again and claimed that "Peak is an IT portfolio management company whose mission is to assemble, ÿnance and manage a portfolio of high-growth-potential companies and assets in some of the fastest-growing tech sectors in China, including ÿntech, e-commerce and cloud-computing".

#### Cubeler Royalty Structure Evidences Self-Dealing

As all previous business endeavors faded away, the company introduced Gold River and Cubeler.

In 2017, the company mentioned Cubeler Inc. For the ÿrst time and noted that Cubeler is a privately held company whose shareholders are also shareholders of the Company.

In 2018, PKK changed disclosures and state that Cubeler was a privately held company who has certain shareholders in common with the Company.

Cubeler's ÿnancial arrangement with the company also screams caution as management had paid advances to Cubeler and when Cubeler fails to fully pay the advance, the company decided "not to execute the right on the assets considering the low value of the advances". See the disclosure below.

> a) The advance to Cubeler, a related entity to the Company, is documented by an on-demand promissory note yielding 8.5% interest annually. In the case that the advance is not fully paid on December 16, 2019, Cubeler shall execute and deliver a hypothec on the universality of the present and future movable assets to the Company. <mark>The Company decided not to execute its rights on the assets considering the low value of the advances</mark>

This is concerning because the advance to the company was  $\sim$ 5% of cash which was obtained through  $\ddot{y}$ nancing just prior. PKK is e, ectively taking invested dollars from shareholders and directing them into their own pockets.

Ironically, despite Cubeler failing to fully pay advances of a minimal amount, PKK found it accretive to acquire Cubler in October 2021 for \$1m in cash and over 11M in PKK shares, equivalent to ~CAD 110M in total consideration. Considering the related party nature of the transaction, and the fact that Cubeler failed to repay its past advances, we highly doubt the economic essence of this transaction and suspect the sole motivating factor behind it to enrich PKK's insiders at the expense of shareholders.n 2017, the company mentioned Cubeler Inc. For the ÿrst time and noted that Cubeler is a privately held company whose shareholders are also shareholders of the Company.

This is concerning because the advance to the company was ~5% of cash which was obtained through ÿnancing. PKK is e<sub>c</sub> ectively taking invested dollars from shareholders and directing them into their own pockets.

Ironically, despite Cubeler failing to fully pay advances of a minimal amount, PKK acquired Cubler in August 2021 for CAD 1M in cash and over 11M in PKK shares, equivalent to  $\sim$ CAD 110M in total consideration. Considering the related party nature of the transaction, and the fact that Cubeler failed to repay advances, we highly doubt the economic essence of this transaction and suspect insider dealing.

#### Impairments to the Gold River Platform

In 2016, PKK launched Gold River Fintech Platform. However, rather quickly, in 2018, an impairment loss of \$471k was recognized for the Gold River platform. In 2019, an impairment loss of \$584k was recognized for the Gold River platform.

> PKK Has Little Strategic Direction, Is Constantly Switching Focus (And Failing), And **Reeks Of Self-Dealing.**

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Oct 4th, 2021



Research Report on Peak Fintech Group (Nasdaq: TNT, CSE: PKK)

### **Conclusion: Fraudulent Disclosures Call For A Delisting**

PKK calls itself a "standout Fintech story" and while we think this is true, we believe it is for all the wrong reasons. Normally, fraudulent companies care enough to at least own the businesses they use to report fake ÿnancials to US investors.

As we have shown with PKK, however, this is not always true.

For years, PKK, a perpetual pivoter, has gotten away without owning a purported, major subsidiary. The company conducted at least two major acquisitions where it never acquired any actual equity interest in the entities it said it bought. Meanwhile, this all occurred as PKK's stock price soared to NASDAQ uplisting.

The problems we outlined with PKK warrant an immediate delisting of the company's shares from US and Canadian stock exchanges. A proper review is in order. The fact that the ownership information is publicly available in China, yet no one has scrutinized the company for what seems appears to be clear and obvious fraud, underlines the importance of activist short-sellers in today's market.

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